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Overview

The general Grouper approach to access governance is to create and maintain access policy groups which are built from institutional meaningful cohorts (reference groups), ad hoc exception groups, and indirect basis groups.

Membership in the access policy group represents a pre-computed access policy decision.  The policy decision is typically communicated to the target services via LDAP or SAML, but can be done in a variety of ways.  To help implement these access control models, review the documentation on the Grouper Template Wizard.

The target service uses the

policy decision from Grouper to determine

what level of access the user has.

The policy decision could be mapped to a hard-coded

application role or a fine-grained permission set managed locally in the service. For example, the user might be dynamically assigned to a group in Confluence due to a SAML

entitlement provisioned via Grouper. The user might then have access to projects

due to configured access

in the Confluence admin screens.

This is explained in the "Policy groups and dynamic application permissions" model below.

Mechanisms to communicate and enforce policy decisions can vary considerably depending on the security needs and capabilities of the target service. However, the overall approach to access

governance with Grouper remains consistent. The

rest of this section uses terminology and models

from NIST SP 800-162 and XACML to demonstrate a variety of models leveraging

the overall approach.

 Note, you could use multiple models at once, or could engineer hybrid approaches.

Access Control Models

Most of the Access Control Models (ACM) lend

themselves to distributed access control, meaning the authority to manage an access control policy or exceptions to policy can be delegated to authorized people. The most common ACMs are listed here, with a diagram and more details below on each one.

The following sections  provide a diagram and more detail on each of the ACMs listed in the table above.

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ACM Policy groups and static application permissions

Like many ACMs that use policy groups, access policy administration and the policy decision point (

pre-computed membership assignments) are done in Grouper and can be communicated to the target service in a variety of ways. Access policy groups in Grouper

enable direct mapping from natural language policy to digital policy and back, and policy is kept up to date automatically as subject attributes change.

Grouper policy groups support audit, compliance, and attestation.

This model can be broadly used with a variety of services.

1. Access policy groups configured in Grouper based on institutional meaningful cohorts (i.e. reference groups, ad hoc groups

1. , etc)
2. Authorization provisioned to application via LDAP, SAML, web services, direct provisioning, etc
3. Application uses those role(s) with hard-coded or static permissions to allow the user to perform actions

ACM Policy groups and dynamic application permissions

In applications with sophisticated RBAC capabilities, fine-grained permission sets are typically configured via an administrative interface within the application itself. These permission sets are then associated with a role

that can be mapped to a set of users. In this model, the user to role mapping is done in Grouper by pairing a normal access

policy group with the role

defined at the target service. The policy of which subjects are mapped to application roles

is similar to other ACMs with policy groups.

1. Access policy groups configured in Grouper based on institutional meaningful cohorts (i.e. reference groups, ad hoc groups, etc) provides User -> Role mapping
2. Authorization provisioned to application e.g. with LDAP, SAML, WS, direct provisioning, etc

2. Fine-grained permission sets are managed at the target service (Role -> Permissions

1. and

1. User → Permissions)

If permissions are also assigned to individual users using the the application's permission management interface (not necessary for this ACM), then Grouper's view of what a user has is not necessarily the same as the application's.  Two users who have the same role in Grouper could have different permissions in the application.  Grouper knows at a high level what access the user has, but you would need to consult the application for the full picture.

ACM Policy group for front door access

Often for pragmatic reasons one wants to limit access to a target service by

preventing authentication from completing or by preventing network traffic from reaching the application. This "front door" access control provides a logical outer perimeter in addition to the applications normal authorization mechanisms. This could be used in situations where the target application does not have sufficient access controls either due to technical or administrative reasons, or to provide another security layer.

In cases where it is preferable to completely limit unauthorized network traffic from reaching the application, a reverse http proxy can be used block unauthorized and possibly nefarious network traffic. Combing "front door" access with other ACM models enables defense-in-depth.  Several cases where this is necessary or desirable are; 1) when the target service has insufficient access controls to limit access based on the desired policy,

2) when the target service lacks a good unauthorized user experience

, and 3) when the application runs on software that might have 0-day exploits and the security patches are difficult to keep up with.

The "front door" policy group membership could be wider than what is actually authorized to use the target application, if the application additionally provides its own authorization (e.g. identify the admin users).  So at a minimum the policy group could contain an affiliation (e.g.  "employee" reference group), even if only certain employees have access to the application. The most precise "front door" policy group would contain only the subjects that have access to the application, either via Grouper policy groups or application specific configuration.

There are several options for the "front door" ACM policy enforcement point (PEP).

1. A "front door" access policy group is configured in Grouper that indicates who can use an application
2. Authorization provisioned (e.g. LDAP, SAML, etc) to the enforcement point (e.g. IdP, F5, Apache)
3. If a user is not authorized they should be directed to the "not allowed for this app" page
4. The application should do its own security using another ACM (e.g. get roles from other Grouper policy groups)

ACM Grouper for access reporting

It is ideal if Grouper can be system of record for authorization for an application, but in many cases it is not possible.  This could be because the application cannot use external roles, or because the application is preferred to manage those things internally (e.g. the UI in the application is needed for use).  In this case hopefully you can feed authorizations from the application, or just who has any authorization, into Grouper.  Now when you go to Grouper and see what someone has access to, you can see that application in the list.

Loading application authorization into Grouper needs to be a regularly schedule task so the data does not diverge.  It could also be loaded near real-time. Several options exist for import authorization data:

1. Grouper loader via SQL or LDAP (preferred)
   1. You could ETL the data to a SQL or LDAP first
2. Web services
3. Custom job
4. Manual process (e.g. export the authorizations to CSV and import into Grouper.  Do this periodically (e.g. monthly)

Once the authorizations are in Grouper you can use Grouper reporting, rules, attestation, deprovisioning, auditing, etc.  This data in Grouper is readonly since it is sourced and managed in the application.  In this case, deprovisioning or attestation must involve a user using the application to remove the unnecessary authorizations.

1. Authorizations are managed in the application
2. Authorizations are loaded into Grouper
3. Deprovision, attest, and report in Grouper by making security changes in the app

ACM Grouper managed permissions

While mostly out of scope for this guide, Grouper does have an advanced RBAC

capability that is suitable for externalizing application permission management. In this model, the target system relies on Grouper for application permission management, including permission definition, role and resource hierarchies, and role to permission mapping.

Grouper role and permission management provides more details on this advanced use of Grouper.

1. Create policy groups similar to other ACMs
2. Convert those groups into roles
3. Configure permission resources and assign to roles / users (in Grouper)
4. Provision roles/permissions to application.  Note, something more complex than LDAP/SAML is generally used, e.g. WS or SQL

ACM eduPersonAffiliation for

authorization

In this model, Grouper is used to master subject attributes that represent some type of affiliation or status at the institution.  Generally these are reference groups for eduPersonAffiliation: member, student, employee, etc.  Actual access policy administration is completely local to the

target service. This model was more common years ago before

sophisticated authorization was common.  It is not recommended to do this since you are back to reference groups without the flexibility of policy groups.

This model is useful for cases when there is an informal relationship between the institution and the service provider, and a locally defined notion of the subject attribute like eduPersonAffiliation is sufficient for access control. However, the model breaks down quickly if a more exact notion of the subject attribute is required or if it needs to be different across services. It is important to remember that cohorts (affiliations, status, class year, etc) are not access policy. Do not be tempted to create service specific versions of

reference groups. Favor creating access policy per service instead. Any application using this model should be comfortable with eduPersonAffiliation standard's notion of "broad-category affiliation assertions".

1. Subject attributes like eduPersonAffiliation are mastered in Grouper

1. Affiliations provisioned to the

1. application typically via SAML

1. Authentication Response
2. The service allows access or uses the affiliation to map to

1. an application role / permission set