



InCommon Assurance Call

Update from the MFA Interoperability Profile Working Group

April 6, 2016

Karen Herrington, Virginia Tech, Chair of the MFA Interoperability Working Group

Host: Chris Spadanuda, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Chair of the InCommon Assurance Advisory Committee





The InCommon Assurance Advisory Committee (AAC) welcomes three new* members.

AAC Roster

- Chris Spadanuda, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (IdP) Chair
- Warren Anderson, LIGO (SP)
- Brett Bieber, University of Nebraska-Lincoln (IdP) *
- Paul Caskey, InCommon/Internet2 (InCommon staff)
- David Crotts, Virginia Tech (auditor)
- Jacob Farmer, Indiana University (member at large)
- Ted Hanss, University of Michigan (InCommon Steering) *
- Joanna Rojas, Duke University (auditor) *

Ex-Officio (non-voting)

- Tom Barton, University of Chicago (InCommon TAC)
- Klara Jelinkova, Rice University (InCommon Steering)





2016 Internet2 Global Summit in Chicago

InCommon Baseline Practices BoF

Wed., May 18, 2016

7:30am - 8:30am

Please join us!



Multifactor Authentication (MFA) Interoperability Profile

Karen Herrington April 6, 2016



Mission

- Working group formed at the request of the Assurance Advisory Committee
- Charge To develop and document requirements for creating and implementing an interoperability profile to allow the community to leverage MFA provided by an InCommon Identity Provider by allowing SPs to rely on a standard syntax and semantics regarding MFA.



Deliverables

- Profile
- Technologies
- Use Cases
- Adoption plan



Work to date

- Weekly calls since the beginning of February
 - building on the work begun by Jacob Farmer in 2015
- MFA Baseline Profile
- Baseline Profile
- Usage Guidance document
- Technologies document describing
 Authentication Factors and Threat Resistance
- Use Cases



MFA Baseline Profile

- Maintained focus on the authentication event
- Defined in terms of risks mitigated
- Mitigated risks include non-real-time attacks such as phishing, offline cracking, online guessing and theft of a (single) factor
- Asserted through authentication context



Baseline Profile

- To establish a base over which other profiles could be defined
- To be used by SPs in conjunction with other profiles in SAML requests to indicate that a higher level profile is preferred, but base level is acceptable
- To provide a value for systems to affirmatively assert when authentication is done successfully but *without* MFA (necessarily) being used

Usage Guidance document

- Provides advice on the use of the profiles in practice
- More explanation about risks that must be mitigated
- Guidance about what constitutes an acceptable "second factor"



Technologies document

- Two tables intended to aid in the selection of acceptable multi-factor authentication technologies for use with the profiles
- Table 1 describes commonly used authentication factors and summarizes their resistance to common threats
- Table 2 summarizes Authentication Types or Groups of Types which meet the needs of authentication profiles



Use Cases

- Solicited use cases for MFA Base level profile
- Some of the most promising for the MFA Base level profile are University System use cases
- Federal services (FICAM) a possibility



What's Next?

- Continuing calls
- Refining documents
- Writing final report
- Preparing for community review in mid-April
- Timeline intended to be in sync with TIER release



Keeping Informed

- MFA Interoperability Profile Wiki <u>https://spaces.internet2.edu/x/CY5HBQ</u>
- InCommon Assurance Wiki <u>https://spaces.internet2.edu/x/4SM</u>
- Join the InCommon Assurance list:
 - Email sympa@incommon.org with this in the subject: subscribe assurance



Questions/Feedback?



Thank you for joining the InCommon Assurance Call

