November 16, 2011 - Results of the InCommon 2-Factor Authentication Survey
The final results of the InCommon 2-Factor Authentication Survey are available here.
June 22, 2011 Call -- PKI Hardware Tokens topic
- Form factor: at least USB in the size/shape of a typical flash drive is required. A family of products that uses the same chip and is available in other form factors is preferred. Smart Card and USB-format with flash being to other desired scenarios.
- FIPS 140-2 Level 2 certification is required.
- Support for Windows and Macintosh required. Linux an important plus. Windows means both 32 and 64 bit platforms.
- Windows mini-driver and Microsoft Smart Card CSP strongly preferred over a required CSP software installation.
- Macintosh support for direct keychain integration is preferred over PKCS-11 and Tokend
- Support for a minimum of three certificates is required. More strongly desired.
- RSA key generation and support for 2048 bit keys required.
- The private key must NOT be exportable from the device.
- Site configurable policies for PIN length and complexity, token timeout, and PIN retries before blocking are required.
- End users must not be able to change policies or parameters WRT minimum PIN and timeout.
- Wireless access to the token (contactless access) highly desirable.
Wireless access to the smart card - e.g., contactless access is desired.
June 8, 2011 PKI Subcommittee Call on PKI Hardware Tokens
Pre-call notes #1
- Form factor: are both smart-card and USB important? USB is more universal (on computers) but smart-cards can be used for things like physical access, copy machine, etc., and probably have longer "insertion life" than USB devices. (I assume we're not addressing certs on cellphones, etc.)
- OS support: We should try to avoid the need for any added software on user platforms. I'm told that there are now standards that allow modern OSs to autoconfigure when seeing a particular device, much like they do with external HDs, printers, etc. Is this a good assumption? What OS(s) support this?
- What's in the x509 object(s) on the device? That has been a serious problem in the past if the content is intended to be understood by a broad set of unrelated services. I think there needs to be several (at least) options but I would like to encourage use of the SIA field to hold a pointer to an appropriate attribute service for the Subject. The AIA field also should contain a pointer to a repository of all valid CA certs in which the Subject name is the Issuer of this cert. One x509 content option should be a Subject name that contains only a unique (to the CA) abstract identifier. Other options would include more about the individual, including email address. Etc.
- Characteristics of the smart chip:
- Is the private key exportable?
- Can it hold multiple x509 objects? Other objects?
- What happens when the x509 object expires? Can the device content be re-written?
- What length PIN is used? Does it have a PIN timeout? Is the timeout fixed or changeable by the user?
- Can the PIN be reset without re-issuing the x509 object(s)? If so, this presents a vulnerability. If not, ...
- What happens if the device is lost or destroyed? Especially in the case where the SN is only an abstract identifier since the aggrieved person will have to prove that s/he was the correct holder of that identifier...
Pre-call notes #2
- Direct support for Mac and Linux preferred over provides source code and its your issue to deal with
Pre-call notes #3
- OS support for Windows (32 & 64-bit). Use of the Windows Smart Card CSP and mini-driver preferred.
- OS support for Macintosh. Direct Keychain integration preferred over a PKCS 11 and TokenD
- Ability to import PKCS-12
- Ability to generate 2048 bit key pairs; private keys are not exportable
- Token management solution that handles any needed formatting, remote PIN resets, archive of admin keys, etc
- Willingness to work with Comodo on token management solution and certificate provisioning
- Discounts would be nice
- Form factor choices (but at least simple usb and small). Dual flash memory and PKI Token a potential plus
- Site configurable token policies (PIN complexity, PIN retries before blocking, inactivity timeout, etc).
- Inability of user to change site PIN policies
- Simple user PIN changes from native OS
- Auto OS certificate registration and deregistration on removal a plus
- Support for multiple certificates a plus but in practice for normal users, not all that great
- FIPS 140-2 Level-2 required
- Token management software is capable of supporting InCommon Silver at a minimum
- Support for at least three certificates, more are preferred
- USB flash drive form factor required, card option with same chip preferred, bluetooth capability a plus
- (a) Template control from Comodo to be able to select CSPs in a secure way and in parallel (b) an integrated stack for both token management and certificate provisioning.
- Prefer 1-3, require 3-1 (XP,Vista,7) 3-2 and 3-3, must not do 1-4-a, require 3-9,
- Linux support is important